Bachelor 2025/2026

Economics of Information

Type: Elective course (Economic Analysis)

Delivered by: Undergraduate Programmes Curriculum Support

Where: Faculty of Economic Sciences

When: 4 year, 3 module

Open to: students of one campus

Instructors: Aleksei Smirnov

Language: English

ECTS credits: 3

Contact hours: 40

Course Syllabus

Abstract

The goal of this course is to introduce students to the role of information in Economics, and to cover related theories and applications. The course is divided into two parts. The first part deals with classical static models of strategic communication, disclosure, signaling and screening. The second part is focused on social learning and strategic experimentation. The main purpose of this part is to learn how these theories can be used to study interesting practical questions. Students should possess basic knowledge of calculus and probability theory.

Learning Objectives

• understand the role of information in modern Economics
• being acquainted with classical and modern ways to model information in Economics
• being able to solve basic and modified models presented in the course
• apply the concepts learned in the course to real life frameworks

Expected Learning Outcomes

• get acquainted with Signaling and Countersignaling models
• getting acquainted with how information transmission between the economic agents can be modeled
• understanding how the economic agents experiment and learn unknown fundamentals

Course Contents

• Asymmetric Information
• Information Transmission
• Experimentation and Learning

Assessment Elements

• Midterm 2
  Midterm 2 covers classes 8-13
• Final Exam
  Final Eam covers classes 15-20
• Midterm 1
  Midterm 1, covers first 6 classes

Interim Assessment

• 2025/2026 3rd module
  0.42 * Final Exam + 0.29 * Midterm 1 + 0.29 * Midterm 2

Bibliography

Recommended Core Bibliography

• Dirk Bergemann, & Juuso Valimaki. (2006). Bandit Problems. Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
• Emir Kamenica, & Matthew Gentzkow. (2011). Bayesian persuasion.
• Jung, W., & Kwon, Y. (1988). Disclosure When The Market Is Unsure Of Information Endowment Of Managers. Journal of Accounting Research, 146.
• Lones Smith, & Peter Sørensen. (1999). Pathological Outcomes of Observational Learning.
• Martin Cripps, Godfrey Keller, & Sven Rady. (2005). Strategic experimentation with exponential bandits.
• Michael Spence. (1973). Job Market Signaling. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, (3), 355. https://doi.org/10.2307/1882010
• Microeconomic theory, Mas-Colell A., Whinston M., 1995
• Pindyck, R. S. (1991). Irreversibility, Uncertainty, and Investment. Journal of Economic Literature, (3), 1110. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.a.aea.jeclit.v29y1991i3p1110.48

Recommended Additional Bibliography

• Callander, S. (2011). Searching and Learning by Trial and Error. American Economic Review, 101(6), 2277–2308. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.6.2277
• Strategic experimentation. (1999). Econometrica, 67(2), 349–374.
• Viral V. Acharya, Peter M. DeMarzo, & Ilan Kremer. (2010). Endogenous Information Flows and the Clustering of Announcements. NBER Working Papers.

Authors

• SMIRNOV ALEKSEI Sergeevich
• KABIROVA IRINA ALEKSANDROVNA