Магистратура
2021/2022
Микроэкономика II
Лучший по критерию «Полезность курса для расширения кругозора и разностороннего развития»
Статус:
Курс обязательный (Прикладная экономика и математические методы)
Направление:
38.04.01. Экономика
Кто читает:
Департамент экономики
Где читается:
Санкт-Петербургская школа экономики и менеджмента
Когда читается:
1-й курс, 3, 4 модуль
Формат изучения:
без онлайн-курса
Охват аудитории:
для своего кампуса
Преподаватели:
Нестеров Александр Сергеевич
Прогр. обучения:
Прикладная экономика и математические методы
Язык:
английский
Кредиты:
6
Контактные часы:
52
Course Syllabus
Abstract
The main question of the course is how to aggregate individual interests into the unique social or group one. To answer on this question different concepts of fairness are applied and characterized. The course begins with the simplest game-theoretic models with two participants and then develops to more complicated n-person, dynamic and cooperative games. Another part of the course is devoted to social choice theory mainly to voting problems. The problems of existence optimal solutions and their finding are studied with the help of the modern mathematical methods.
Learning Objectives
- The main purpose of the course “Microeconomics 2” is to develop the competence of students in Microeconomics, with an especial attention to decision-making models including game theory and social choice theory.
Course Contents
- The subject and methods of game theory. Conflicts and cooperation, their mathematical models.
- Matrix games. Saddle points. Mixed strategies. Minimax Theorem.
- Infinite two-person zero-sum games. Existence theorems
- Non-cooperative n-person games. Optimality concepts in non-cooperative games, equilibrium. Game-theoretic models of oligopolies. Auctions.
- The mixed extension of non-cooperative games. Nash’s Theorem on existence of equilibria in mixed strategies in finite n-person games.
- Refiniments of equilibria. Perfect equilibria, strong equilibria, correlated equilibria.
- Games with incomplete information. Bayesian equilibria.
- Games in extensive form. Zermelo's Theorem on the existence of pure equlibria in finite extensive games with perfect information. Behavioral strategies Kuhn's Theorem.
- Dynamic games. Stochastic and recursive games. Repeated games with complete information.
- Cooperative games with transferable utilities. Characteristic functions. Solutions of cooperative games. The core and its existence. The Shapley value.
- Cost and profit sharing rules. Egalitarian and utilitarian rules.
- Bargaining problems. Axiomatic characterizations of bargaining solutions.
- Social welfare functions. Arrow’s Theorem and its extensions.
- Voting theory. Manipulation of preferences.
