Бакалавриат
2026/2027
Организационная экономика
Статус:
Курс по выбору (Совместная программа по экономике НИУ ВШЭ и РЭШ)
Где читается:
Факультет экономических наук
Когда читается:
3-й курс, 4 модуль
Охват аудитории:
для своего кампуса
Язык:
английский
Кредиты:
3
Контактные часы:
32
Course Syllabus
Abstract
Neoclassical economics traditionally viewed a firm as a production set. Given market prices, the
firm chooses a set of inputs to buy, turns them into outputs, and then sells those outputs on the
market in order to maximize profits. This "black box" view of the firm captures many important
aspects of what a firm does, but leaves many questions unanswered: why do firms exist?, why
some firms decide to buy inputs and others to make them?, what do managers do?, what is the
role of hierarchy?, why do firms often appear dysfunctional?, why do inefficient and efficient
firms coexist?, should we care about their coexistence?
The purpose of this course is to move beyond the Neoclassical view of the firm and to provide you
with a set of models that you can use as a first step when thinking about modern issues affecting
private and public organizations. We will also explore empirical applications, experimental
approaches and case studies of real firms. Topics include the rationale behind the existence of
different types of firms, the formation of hierarchical structures, and the design of incentive
systems in the presence of asymmetric information and conflicting interests. The models we study
will be applicable to fields such as strategic consulting, management, and antitrust regulation.
Learning Objectives
- Formulate and solve principal-agent models (including the LEN framework) to determine optimal incentive intensity and contract design under various informational assumptions. Analyze multitasking environments and predict how narrowly focused incentive schemes distort effort allocation across measurable and non-measurable activities. Evaluate the conditions under which relative performance evaluation, tournaments, or subjective performance assessment are optimal governance mechanisms. Apply transaction cost logic to assess make-or-buy decisions, vertical integration strategies, and outsourcing choices in diverse industry contexts. Use property rights theory to analyze how alternative ownership structures affect investment incentives and organizational performance. Design simple incentive experiments (lab or field), formulate testable hypotheses, choose appropriate treatments and outcome measures, and identify potential threats to validity. Interpret empirical evidence from experimental and quasi-experimental studies on organizational practices, including compensation, monitoring, and governance.
Expected Learning Outcomes
- Analyze the trade-offs in multitasking environments and predict behavioral responses to incentive schemes
Course Contents
- Formal contracts: LEN Model. Multitasking. Relative Performance Evaluation. Shorttermism and the financial crises
- Decision-Making in Organizations: Hierarchies. Authority. Delegation
- Theories of the Firms: Neoclassical Theory. Transaction Costs Economics. Property Rights Theory
- Laboratory and Field Experiments on Incentives in Organizational Settings
Bibliography
Recommended Core Bibliography
- Garicano, L., & Rayo, L. (2015). Why organizations fail: models and cases. CEPR Discussion Papers. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.p.cpr.ceprdp.10395
- Paul Glewwe, Nauman Ilias, & Michael Kremer. (2003). Teacher Incentives. NBER Working Papers. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.p.nbr.nberwo.9671
Recommended Additional Bibliography
- Coase, R. H. (1988). The Nature of the Firm: Influence. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, (1), 33. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.a.oup.jleorg.v4y1988i1p33.47
- Coase, R. H. (1988). The Nature of the Firm: Meaning. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, (1), 19. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.a.oup.jleorg.v4y1988i1p19.32
- Coase, R. H. (1988). The Nature of the Firm: Origin. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, (1), 3. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.a.oup.jleorg.v4y1988i1p3.17