Бакалавриат
2026/2027
Экономика информации
Статус:
Курс по выбору (Экономика и статистика)
Кто читает:
Департамент теоретической экономики
Где читается:
Факультет экономических наук
Когда читается:
4-й курс, 3 модуль
Охват аудитории:
для всех кампусов НИУ ВШЭ
Язык:
английский
Кредиты:
3
Контактные часы:
40
Course Syllabus
Abstract
The goal of this course is to introduce students to the role of information in Economics, and to cover related theories and applications. The course is divided into two parts. The first part deals with classical static models of strategic communication, disclosure, signaling and screening. The second part is focused on social learning and strategic experimentation. The main purpose of this part is to learn how these theories can be used to study interesting practical questions. The primary language of the course is English. Students should possess basic knowledge of calculus and probability theory.
Learning Objectives
- understand the role of information in modern Economics
- being acquainted with classical and modern ways to model information in Economics
- being able to solve basic and modified models presented in the course
- apply the concepts learned in the course to real life frameworks
Expected Learning Outcomes
- get acquainted with Signaling and Countersignaling models
- getting acquainted with how information transmission between the economic agents can be modeled
- Being able to solve basic models of costly information acquisition and rational inattention and to explain how information costs affect economic decisions.
Course Contents
- Asymmetric Information
- Information Transmission
- Information Acquisition and Rational Inattention
Assessment Elements
- Midterm 1Midterm 1, covers the first 8 classes
- Midterm 2Midterm 2 covers classes 8-13
- FinalThe final exam covers classes 1-20
Bibliography
Recommended Core Bibliography
- Dye, R. (1985). Disclosure Of Nonproprietary Information. Journal of Accounting Research, 123.
- Emir Kamenica, & Matthew Gentzkow. (2011). Bayesian persuasion.
- Jung, W., & Kwon, Y. (1988). Disclosure When The Market Is Unsure Of Information Endowment Of Managers. Journal of Accounting Research, 146.
- Microeconomic theory, Mas-Colell, A., 1995
- Spence, M. (1973). Job Market Signaling. https://doi.org/10.2307/1882010
- Vincent P. Crawford, & Joel Sobeli. (1982). Strategic information transmission.