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Обычная версия сайта
2025/2026

Экспериментальная экономика

Статус: Дисциплина общефакультетского пула
Когда читается: 3 модуль
Охват аудитории: для своего кампуса
Язык: английский
Кредиты: 3
Контактные часы: 40

Course Syllabus

Abstract

This course in Experimental Economics introduces students to the design, implementation, and analysis of controlled experiments used to explore economic behavior. Students will learn how to test economic theories by creating incentives and observing real decision-making in areas such as markets, auctions, public goods, and bargaining. The course covers all the critical decisons involved in designing economic experiments, discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the experimental approach in relation to other methodologies for addressing economic questions, and gives an overview of major results in the field with a focus on behavioural game theory.
Learning Objectives

Learning Objectives

  • Understand key concepts in experimental design.
  • Understand strengths and weaknesses of experimental approaches to economic problems.
  • Develop critical thinking skills in the context of reading experimental articles.
  • Apply experimental methodology to real-world economic problems.
  • Apply experimental methodology to test behavioural models.
Expected Learning Outcomes

Expected Learning Outcomes

  • Students understand reasons to use experimental methodology.
  • Define external validity and explain its importance for generalizing experimental findings.
  • Critique claims about policy relevance based on experimental results.
  • Define different social preferences in economic terms and distinguish them from each other and related motives (e.g., social norms).
  • Describe how social norms shape behavior in economic experiments.
  • Design an experiment to measure the strength and content of social norms in a given setting.
  • Explain the free-rider problem and its manifestation in public goods experiments.
  • Describe the structure and equilibrium predictions of alternating-offer bargaining models (e.g., Rubinstein).
Course Contents

Course Contents

  • Introduction
  • Experimental design
  • External validity
  • The replication crisis
  • Topics in experimental economics (social preferences, public goods games, bargaining, bounded rationality in games)
Assessment Elements

Assessment Elements

  • non-blocking In class quizzes
  • non-blocking Analysis of published paper
  • non-blocking Test
Interim Assessment

Interim Assessment

  • 2025/2026 3rd module
    0.26 * Analysis of published paper + 0.24 * In class quizzes + 0.5 * Test
Bibliography

Bibliography

Recommended Core Bibliography

  • John H. Kagel, & Alvin E. Roth. (2016). The Handbook of Experimental Economics, Volume 2. Princeton University Press. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.b.pup.pbooks.10874
  • John H. Kagel, & Alvin E. Roth. (2020). The Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton University Press.
  • The handbook of experimental economics, , 1995
  • The handbook of experimental economics. Vol.2: ., , 2015

Recommended Additional Bibliography

  • Glenn Harrison. (2011). The methodological promise of experimental economics. Journal of Economic Methodology, (2), 183. https://doi.org/10.1080/1350178X.2011.580135

Authors

  • Tremiuen Dzheims Kristofer Ross